the analysis of values and worth judgments
(Gr. axios, of like price, worthy, and logos, account, explanation, concept). Modern-day term for theory of price (the required, chosen, good), examination of its nature, criteria, and metaphysical status. Had its boost in Plato's principle of types or Tips (concept of the great); originated in Aristotle's Organon, Ethics, Poetics, and Metaphysics (Book Lambda). Stoics and Epicureans investigated the summum bonum. Christian viewpoint (St. Thomas) built on Aristotle's identification of greatest worth with final cause in Jesus as "a living becoming, eternal, many great." In modern thought, apart from scholasticism plus the system of Spinoza (Ethica, 1677), where values are metaphysically grounded, the various values had been examined in split sciences, until Kant's Critiques, where the relations of knowledge to moral, aesthetic, and religious values were analyzed. In Hegel's idealism, morality, art, religion, and viewpoint were made the capstone of their dialectic. R. H. Lotze "desired for the reason that which will function as ground of this which will be" (Metaphysik, 1879). Nineteenth century evolutionary concept, anthropology, sociology, therapy, and economics subjected price experience to empirical evaluation, and anxiety had been once more set on the diversity and relativity of worth phenomena rather than on their unity and metaphysical nature. F. Nietzscheis also Sprach Zarathustra (1883-1885) and Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887) aroused brand new curiosity about the nature of value. F. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1889), identified price with love. In twentieth-century the definition of axiology ended up being obviously very first used by Paul Lapie (Logique de la volonte, 1902) and E. von Hartmann (Grundriss der Axiologie, 1908). Activated by Ehrenfels (program der Werttheorie, 1897), Meinong (Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, 1894-1899), and Simmel (Philosophie diverses Geldes, 1900). W. M. Urban wrote 1st systematic treatment of axiology in English (Valuation, 1909), phenomenological in method under J. M. Baldwin's impact. At the same time H. Münsterberg composed a neo-Fichtean system of values (The Eternal standards, 1909). Among crucial current contributions tend to be: B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value (1912), a free reinterpretation of Hegelianism; W. R. Sorley, Moral Values together with notion of Jesus (1918, 1921), protecting a metaphysical theism; S. Alexander, area, Time, and Deity (1920), practical and naturalistic; N. Hartmann, Ethik (1926), detail by detail analysis of kinds and guidelines of value; R. B. Perry's magnum opus, General concept of Value (1926), "its meaning and basic principles construed with regards to interest"; and J. Laird, the thought of Value (1929), noteworthy for historical exposition. A naturalistic theory happens to be manufactured by J. Dewey (concept of Valuation, 1939), for which "not merely is science itself a value . . . but it is the supreme way of the legitimate dedication of valuations." A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936) expounds the scene of reasonable positivism that value is "nonsense." J. Hessen, Wertphilosophie (1937), provides a merchant account of recent German axiology from a neo-scholastic perspective. The issues of axiology end up in four primary groups, specifically, those regarding (1) the nature of price, (2) the sorts of value, (3) the criterion of price, and (4) the metaphysical status of value. (1) The nature of value experience. Is valuation fulfillment of need (voluntarism: Spinoza, Ehrenfels), satisfaction (hedonism: Epicurus, Bentham, Meinong), interest (Perry), inclination (Martineau), pure rational will (formalism: Stoics, Kant, Royce), apprehension of tertiary attributes (Santayana), synoptic connection with the unity of character (personalism: T. H. Green, Bowne), any knowledge that plays a role in improved life (evolutionism: Nietzsche), or "the relation of things as methods to the conclusion or effect really achieved" (pragmatism, instrumentalism: Dewey). (2) the kinds of worth. Many axiologists distinguish between intrinsic (consummatory) values (finishes), prized due to their very own sake, and instrumental (contributory) values (means), which are factors (whether as financial goods or as all-natural activities) of intrinsic values. Most intrinsic values may also be instrumental to further price experience; some instrumental values are natural and on occasion even disvaluable intrinsically. Frequently named intrinsic values will be the (morally) good, the real, the wonderful, additionally the holy. Values of play, of work, of association, and of actual wellbeing are acknowledged. Some (with Montague) question if the real is precisely to-be thought to be a value, since some the fact is disvaluable, some natural; but love of truth, aside from effects, appears to establish the worthiness of truth. There is disagreement about perhaps the holy (religious value) is a distinctive type (Schleiermacher, Otto), or an attitude toward other values (Kant, Höffding), or a combination of the two (Hocking). There is also disagreement about perhaps the selection of values is irreducible (pluralism) or whether all values are rationally associated in a hierarchy or system (Plato, Hegel, Sorley), which values interpenetrate or coalesce into an overall total experience. (3) The criterion of worth. The typical for evaluating values is influenced by both mental and rational concept. Hedonists get the standard in the quantity of enjoyment derived by the individual (Aristippus) or culture (Bentham). Intuitionists attract an ultimate insight into choice (Martineau, Brentano). Some idealists recognize a target system of logical norms or beliefs as criterion (Plato, Windelband), while some put more anxiety on logical wholeness and coherence (Hegel, Bosanquet, Paton) or inclusiveness (T. H. Green). Naturalists discover biological success or adjustment (Dewey) is the conventional. Despite variations, there was much in common inside outcomes of the effective use of these criteria. (4) The metaphysical standing of value. What is the connection of values on details examined by natural research (Koehler), of Sein to Sollen (Lotze, Rickert), of real human experience of value to truth independent of man (Hegel, Pringle-Pattlson, Spaulding)? You can find three primary answers: subjectivism (value is completely dependent on and in accordance with man experience of it: so many hedonists, naturalists, positivists); rational objectivism (values are reasonable essences or subsistences, independent of these being known, yet with no existential status or action in fact); metaphysical objectivism (values -- or norms or ideals -- tend to be fundamental, objective, and active constituents associated with metaphysically real: so theists, absolutists, and certain realists and naturalists like S. Alexander and Wieman). -- E.S.B.