Both accept the paradox in the qualified sense that no one can deliberately act contrary to what appears to him good, and that perfect virtue is inseparably bound up with perfect wisdom or moral insight.
Herein lies the paradox which is also the deepest truth of our spiritual life.
Some of the impression of paradox here is due to Anselm's treating the Absolute simply as one among many other beings, and to his treating existence simply as one element in the quantitative sum of perfections.
In the first place, he displays in its most naked form the common but unproved idealistic paradox of a sense of sensations, according to which touch apprehends not pressure but a sensation of pressure, sight apprehends not colour but a sensation of colour, and there is no difference between the sensory operation and the sensible object apprehended by any sense, even within the sentient organism.
Similarly, though the influence of rhetoric upon his language, as well as upon his general treatment, is clearly perceptible, he has not the perverted love of antithesis, paradox and laboured word-painting which offends us in Tacitus; and, in spite of the Venetian richness of his colouring, and the copious flow of his words, he is on the whole wonderfully natural and simple.
That a revolution largely inspired by generous and humane feeling should have issued in such havoc and such crimes is a paradox which astounded spectators and still perplexes the historian.
The Stoic doctrine of the worthlessness of ordinary human virtue, and the stern paradox that all offenders are equally, in so far as all are absolutely, guilty, find their counterparts in Christianity; but the latter (maintaining this ideal severity in the moral standard, with an emotional consciousness of what is involved in it quite unlike that of the Stoic) overcomes its practical exclusiveness through faith.
The fundamental difficulty underlying this logic is the paradox more clearly expressed by Zeno and to a large extent represented in almost all modern discussion, namely that the evidence of the senses contradicts the intellect.
The result of this theory of ethics is of great value as emphasizing the importance of a systematic view of conduct, but it fails to resolve satisfactorily the great Socratic paradox that evil is the result of ignorance.
The paradox of the arrow (7), says Mr Russell, is a plain statement of a very elementary fact: the arrow is at rest at very moment of its flight: Zeno's only mistake was in inferring (if he did infer) that it was therefore at the same point at one moment as at another.