The great merit of conceptual logic was the demand for a mental analysis of mental reasoning, and the direct analysis of reasoning into judgments which are the sole premises and conclusions of reasoning and of all mental inferences.
It was natural enough that the originators of conceptual logic, seeing that judgments can be expressed by propositions, and conceptions by terms, should fall into the error of supposing that, as propositions consist of terms, so judgments consist of conceptions, and that there is a triple mental order - conception, judgment, reasoning - parallel to the triple linguistic order - term, proposition, discourse.
He starts, that is in logic, with conceptual units apparently self-contained and admitting of nothing but external relation, but proceeds to justify the intrinsic relation between the matter of his units by an appeal to the fact of the coherence of all contents of thought.
I discuss various special cases of this conceptual metaphor in my speech.
The conceptual logic has made the mistake of making ideation a stage in thought prior to judgment.
At the same time his psychology, though maintaining his empiricism, contained some seeds of conceptual logic, and indirectly of formal logic. Intellectual development, which according to the logic of the Analytics consists of sense, memory, experience, induction and intellect, according to the psychology of the De Anima consists of sense, imagination and intellect, and one division of intellect is into conception of the undivided and combination of conceptions as one (De An.
These are easy to spot: They rely on huge conceptual leaps without a framework to support them.
But we must first consider the mental analysis of inference, and this brings us to conceptual and formal logic.
If some, and not the least essential, of these aspects are quasi-negative, it must be remembered that negations - witness the Unseen, the Unknown, the Infinite of a more advanced theology - are well adapted to supply that mystery on which the religious consciousness feeds with the slight basis of conceptual support it needs.
Their point is to stretch Hume's phenomenalism so as to embrace all science, by contending that mechanism is not at the bottom of phenomena, but is only the conceptual shorthand by aid of which men of 'science can briefly describe phenomena, and that all science is description and not explanation.