Even then the day might have been saved had Blucher been able to find even twenty squadrons accustomed to gallop together, but the Prussian cavalry had been dispersed amongst the infantry commands, and at the critical moment it proved impossible for them to deliver a united and decisive attack.
During the night Wellington received the reassuring news that Blucher would bring two corps certainly, and possibly four, to Waterloo, and determined to accept battle.
On the 25th of January, Blucher entered Nancy, and, moving rapidly up the valley of the Moselle, was in communication with the Austrian advanced guard near La Rothiere on the afternoon of the 28th.
Failing to appreciate this fully, Wellington omitted to order an immediate concentration on his inner (left) flank as Blucher had done, and the danger of Blucher's position was thus enormously increased.
He could at least beat Blucher and render the Prussians unfit for any serious operation except retreat on June 17, although he could no longer expect to destroy the Prussian army.
They turned out to be stragglers; but their capture for a time helped to confirm the idea, prevalent in the French army, that Blucher was drawing off towards his base.
Had Blucher gone eastwards, Grouchy, holding the Dyle, could easily have held back any future Prussian advance towards Wellington.
The villages were captured and recaptured, but generally the French had the better of the fighting, for they compelled Blucher to use up more and more of his reserves, and prevented the Prussians from breaking through to the southward of S.
Once Wellington and Blucher were destroyed he would move southwards and meet the other allies on the Rhine.
Napoleon was here defeated, and with only 30,000 men at his back he was compelled to renounce all ideas of a further offensive, and he retired to rest his troops to Reims. Here he remained unmolested for a few days, fop Blucher was struck down by sickness, and in his absence nothing was done.