In this third part Aquinas discusses the person, office and work of Christ, and had begun to discuss the sacraments, when death put an end to his labours.
Raymond Lully, in a dialogue with an infidel thinker, broke a lance in support of the orthodox doctrine, and carried on a crusade against the Arabians in every university; and a disciple of Thomas Aquinas drew up a list (De erroribus philosophorum) of the several delusions and errors of each of the thinkers from Kindi to Averroes.
In his Encyclical of August 4, 1879, which directed the clergy to take the teachings of Aquinas as the basis of their theological position.
Another chief point of difference with Aquinas was in regard to the freedom of the will, which Duns Scotus maintained absolutely.
Besides other works he wrote Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione, concordia (4to, Lisbon, 1588); a commentary on the first part of the Summa of Thomas Aquinas (2 vols., fol., Cuenca, 1 593); and a treatise De justitia et jure (6 vols., 1 593160 9).
Albert and Aquinas both profess the moderate Aristotelian Realism which treats genera and species only as substantiae secundae, yet as really inherent in the individuals, and constituting their form or essence.
This is to upset the compromise of Aquinas and go back to a Christian platonism.
In his ethical discussions (a full account of which is given under Ethics) Aquinas distinguishes theological from natural virtues and vices; the theological virtues are faith, hope and charity; the natural, justice, prudence and the like.
Further, while the genius of Aquinas was constructive, that of Duns Scotus was destructive; Aquinas was a philosopher, Duns a critic. The latter has been said to stand to the former in the relation of Kant to Leibnitz.
The existence of God is maintained by Albert and Aquinas to be domonstrable by reason; but here again they reject the ontological argument of Anselm, and restrict themselves to the a posteriori proof, rising after the manner of Aristotle from that which is prior for us to that which is prior by nature or in itself.