In the fight at Gdow (February 2 6th), where Benedek laid the foundations of the military reputation that was to end so tragically at KOniggratz, flail and scythe wrought more havoc in the rebel ranks than the Austrian musketry.
Armee 1866 (Berlin, 1900); Harbauer, Trautenau, Custozza, Lissa (Leipzig, 1907); Kovalik, FZM von Benedek and der Krieg 1866 (see also article BENEDEK, LUDWIG, RITTER VON); Anon.
Meanwhile Benedek had in fact assigned only one corps with the reserve cavalry to oppose a Prussian advance towards Vienna, and the remaining seven retired to Olmiitz, where they were on the flank of a Prussian advance on Vienna, and had all the resources of Hungary behind them to enable them to recuperate.
According to this, the Austrian troops already in Bohemia, 1st corps, Count Clam-Gallas, 30,000 strong, were to receive the Saxons if the latter were forced to evacuate their own country, and to act as an advanced guard or containing wing to the main body under Feldzeugmeister von Benedek (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, 10th corps) which was to concentrate at Olmiitz, whence the Prussian staff on insufficient evidence concluded the Austrians intended to attack Silesia, with Breslau as their objective.
Moltke, knowing well the danger for a great army of being forced into a battle with an unfordable river behind it, and with his naturally strong bent towards the defensive in tactics, concluded that Benedek would elect to hold the left bank of the Elbe, between the fortified towns of Josephstadt and Kiiniggra,tz, with his right thrown back and covered by the lower courses of the Aupa and the Mettau.